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In recent years, banks have become increasingly aware of the credit risk borne in lending in the 
interbank market and they select their counterparties accordingly. They may also fear that if they 
come across a bad borrower, rescue plans will be skewed towards domestic creditors; moreover, 
lenders may prefer to defend their rights in their own regulatory and legal jurisdiction. Using 2004-
09 data, this paper argues that these elements, the “resolution edge” of the domestic creditor, 
contributed to the increase in the home bias of interbank lending by euro-area banks from mid-2007 
on, while a more consistent downward pattern emerges in the home bias of banks from five non-
euro-area countries (including the US and the UK). The intuition is that when the crisis broke out, 
euro-area banks reckoned that within-the-area cross-border interbank loans carried a distinct risk 
compared with domestic loans. By contrast, a large Swiss bank, for example, did not need to wait 
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1.  Introduction and objectives 1 
After the outbreak of the current market turmoil, home bias in the interbank lending of banks from 
twelve euro-area countries increased to an extent without parallel among banks operating in five 
relevant outside-the-area countries used for control purposes.
2 In June 2007, a normalized home bias 
indicator – taking values between -1 when banks lends only cross-border and +1 when they lend only 
domestically, with 0 signalling no specific preference towards domestic counterparties – stood at 0.45 
on average across the twelve euro-area national banking systems, only marginally higher than the 
average of 0.41 recorded for the five non-euro-area countries. By September 2009 (the end-point of the 
data set of this research), the former measure had increased to 0.56, while the latter had fallen to 0.37. 
By this time, the degree of home bias within the area had erased the gains of the previous years, if one 
considers that in March 2004 (entry point of the data set) the indicator stood at 0.57, and 0.43 was the 
corresponding measure for the five control countries.
3 
The aim of the present work is to gather evidence on why home bias increased when tensions became 
more acute and why this was a distinct pattern of euro-area banks. The research is structured around 
the findings of the ample literature investigating investors’ preference for holding less foreign assets 
than predicted by standard portfolio theory, a stylised fact which translates, in the context of the 
interbank market, into the question why banks lend proportionally less to foreign counterparties (for a 
few key references see French and Poterba 1991, Lewis 1999, and Sørensen, Wu and Zhu 2007; a full 
issue of the Journal of International of Money and Finance, 2007, was devoted to the themes of financial 
globalization and integration). The best known explanations of home bias, which tops a list of six major 
puzzles in applied macroeconomics (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000), include hedging of currency risk, 
transaction costs, unevenness in information, as well as costs of trading goods internationally.
4 It is 
worth verifying how and whether these arguments fit into the decoupling of trends in interbank lending 
home bias. 
At first glance, heightened currency risk would appear to be an acceptable reason for a decline in 
lending of interbank deposits denominated in foreign currency (“foreign” being the borrower’s 
currency). Insofar as this hypothesis holds true – for a simple financial product such as an interbank 
deposit FX hedging is readily available in financial markets – home bias would tend to increase as such 
deposits are relatively more frequent in cross-border deals than in domestic ones.
5 However, the 
statistics do not bear this out. First, a breakdown of cross-border deposits according to the alternative 
of domestic versus foreign currency does not point to any significant difference in trends in home bias. 
Second, if such a cause-effect link were at play, it should have prompted a relative increase in the home 
                                                 
1  I would like to thank P. Angelini, D.J. Marchetti, A. Schiavone, L. Tornetta, F. Vergara Caffarelli and two anonymous 
referees for a number of suggestions. Several exchange of views with C.O. Gelsomino helped me develop the original 
idea of the paper. Special thanks are due to C. Iazzetta for compiling the data sets, S. Nobili for making available his 
estimates on money market risk premiums and C. Stamegna and C. Stone who helped to revise the text. The views 
expressed in this paper are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. The usual disclaimers apply. 
2  The two sets of countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Portugal for the euro area and the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and 
Switzerland for the control group. 
3  Referring to the more conventional (but also somewhat less comparable) share of domestic lending in total interbank 
lending, this averaged 54.4% for the banks of the twelve euro-area countries in March 2004, falling to 43.0% in June 
2007 and rising again to 53.5% in September 2009; the corresponding figures for the banks from the five control 
countries are 40.4%, 37.9% and 34.7%. 
4  Additional references to these items can be found in Adler and Dumas (1983) and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994). 
5  I n  t h e  U K  s o m e  4 0 %  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  c r o s s - b o r d e r  i n t e r b ank loans relate to the exchange of foreign-currency-
denominated deposits, compared to a share of 90% in cross-border loans. In other countries, the gap is even wider.   6
bias of the non-euro-area countries’ banks in the sample (which lend more foreign-denominated 
deposits over the border, in relative terms) compared with that of the ones in the euro area, contrary to 
what the data suggest. 
Transactions costs are an even less plausible candidate. Thanks to the single settlement platform 
TARGET2, all banks in the European Union – irrespective of location – are offered the same high-
quality services, facilities and interfaces, as well as a single price structure 
(http://www.ecb.int/paym/t2/features/html/index.en.html). It should be added that no serious 
incident in this platform has been recorded in recent years and, as such, there is also no obvious 
operational reason for banks to be cautious about transferring their funds cross-border (Flannery, 
1996). 
The third item of the taxonomy deals with information. There is ample empirical evidence that, ceteris 
paribus, investors prefer assets issued in their own constituency because they have better and more up-
to-date information about them. Developments in technology may have weakened the (inverse) 
relationship between quality of information and investor-asset distance (Petersen and Rajan 2002, Felici 
and Pagnini 2008) but the thrust of the argument remains unchallenged. For example, in retail banking, 
recent studies confirm that applicants living closer to the bank are more likely to be granted a loan and 
be charged lower interest rates (Berger et al. 2005, Degryse 2004, Degryse and Ongena 2005, Felici and 
Pagnini 2008, Carey and Nini 2007). Even in financial markets where a wealth of data is available to any 
trader via standard news and data providers, distance remains associated with unevenness of 
information. Some news may be circulated by word of mouth and lose quality as the distance lengthens, 
which may explain the finding that traders tend to replicate the choice of other managers operating 
from the same financial centre (Hong, Kubik and Stein 2005). Alternatively, data may actually be 
available to any trader, but nonetheless domestic investors are better equipped to understand the 
information in local news (Dumas, Lewis and Osambela 2011). If this is true, then this argument may 
have become more relevant in recent years when the financial market turmoil made it more difficult to 
screen would-be borrowers. However, heterogeneity in information is at odds with the decoupling of 
trends in home bias of euro-area banks compared with non-euro-area ones. In other words, why should 
this heterogeneity have played a significant role only on the first pool of banks? 
Finally, regarding the fourth argument put forward by the mainstream literature, if the concept of cost 
of trading internationally is understood narrowly, e.g. presence of trading fees and suchlike, then the 
remarks above about the role of TARGET2 apply again. Therefore, I would argue in favour of a 
broader interpretation, in which the cost includes the potential hurdles associated with recovering a 
credit from a foreign borrower, when things take a turn for the worse. The following quotations 
summarize the current state of affairs: 
Bluntly, it is no good assuming that an internationally active bank can be regulated as a single unit if, when 
distress comes, differences in the insolvency or resolution regimes of the various countries in which it operates 
effectively split the bank into a series of de facto distinct, local entities. (Haldane, 2009) 
...cross-border banks are international in life, but national in death. (Goodhart, 2009) 
...national and regional authorities should review resolution regimes and bankruptcy laws in light of recent 
experience to ensure that they permit an orderly wind-down of large complex cross-border financial institutions. 
(G20 Declaration of 15 November 2008). 
...like it or not, that is a reality and such limitations [in international coordination] do arise for a couple of 
reasons. First, with public money injections, a government is in a position to pay more attention to taxpayers’ 
interests, and naturally has incentives for ring-fencing interests of its own country. Second, bankruptcy legislation of 
financial institutions differs between countries. (Shirakawa, 2009) 
These quotes illustrate the point that banks’ resolution procedures are still largely a national matter and, 
tellingly, the G20 declaration calls for greater harmonization. This echoes a point made in the academic 
literature, namely that there is no internationally agreed key standard in the area of insolvency (Arner 
and Norton 2009).    7
While this state of affairs is not new, as the crisis deepened its expected or perhaps simply perceived 
upshot on foreign lenders was magnified. Events such as the demise of Northern Rock and, even more 
resoundingly, that of Lehman Brothers made it clear that no bank is beyond the risk of default and that 
this could draw its lenders into a legal tangle. Accordingly, a number of recent papers (Cassola, 
Holthausen and Lo Duca 2008, Angelini, Nobili and Picillo 2009, for the euro money market; Taylor 
and Williams 2008 and Afonso, Kovner and Schoar 2010, for the US dollar market) lend support to the 
view that in the interbank market dealers now pay regular attention to the borrower’s risk 
characteristics.  
Against this background, the odds are that a risk-averse agent will be more concerned about credit 
recovery procedures when these take place in a foreign regulatory and legal jurisdiction (Banca d’Italia 
2010). In fact, there may be more at play than simple uneasiness about dealing with a foreign legal 
setting. National authorities could be tempted to pay more attention to domestic stakeholders, in one 
way or the other, when they rescue a troubled bank, as authoritatively pointed out by Shirakawa 
(Governor of the Bank of Japan). Moreover, market participants may reasonably expect – especially 
when rampant uncertainty shocks the markets – that the likelihood of a bank’s bail-out increases with 
its role in the domestic market and economy.
6 In the following I will refer to this basket of factors that 
tilt the balance in favour of domestic lenders as the “resolution edge” (or, more briefly, the edge). 
The basic intuition derived from the analysis carried out in this paper is that the “edge” has played a 
significant role in increasing the home bias of euro-area national banking systems since 2007, although 
it is not necessarily the only explanation. This is not because the “resolution edge” is bound to be 
higher within the area than outside it. Instead, I argue in favour of different dynamics of the weight of 
the edge in the traders’ decision-making process. Echoing an oft-repeated remark, before the crisis large 
banks in particular increasingly operated across the monetary union as if they were dealing in a 
domestic context. That is, they apparently considered any national “resolution edge” within the area 
marginal at best. Conversely, once the banks’ risk of default became an issue of judgement, they 
weighed the national divide more cautiously. Possibly, the sheer novelty of the divide made it more 
difficult to price it in cross-border contracts and in this way it impaired the integration of the market. If 
the multinational structure of groups such as Unicredit and Deutsche Bank is a good example of the 
earlier mood, the management of the demise of Fortis in 2008 tells us something about the new 
situation, in which the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg authorities each effectively bailed out their own 
domestic parts of the embattled group.
7 From this standpoint, the crisis appears less of a turning point 
for banks from outside the area, since quite likely they always discounted the specific risks associated 
with cross-border transactions. Put simply, a large Swiss bank, for instance, did not need to wait for 
2007 to realize that its business in New York was a very different matter from a deal in Zürich. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the data used in the analysis and 
presents some descriptive statistics. Section 3 introduces a micro-based optimization model on the 
choice of counterparties in the interbank market. Section 4 is about the econometrics of the home bias 
from 2004 to 2009. Section 5 concludes. A note to the reader may usefully end this introduction. This 
paper exploits a number of data sets and the reasoning flows across various sets of statistics; to avoid 
breaking up the text with data, while some key tables and charts are presented in the core part of the 
paper, others are shown only at the end.
8 
 
                                                 
6  The fact that the cost of the intervention is eventually borne by the taxpayer may warrant a decision by the political 
authority to provide more help when more domestic interests are at stake.  
7  Press release of 29 September 2008 at http://www.dnb.nl/en/news-and-publications/news-and-archive/persberichten-
2008/dnb188604.jsp). The fate of Fortis seems to be no exception to the rule and the failure of Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991 is a safe precedent on the complexity of crisis management of a conglomerate 
with global business and counterparts. 
8  These tables and charts are coded with a capital A (“Table A.x”).   8
2.  The data and some descriptive statistics 
2.1   The data sets 
The main data set used in the analysis is compiled with data on outstanding stocks of interbank loans 
(short-term maturity) exchanged amongst banks from seventeen countries, of which twelve are from 
the euro area (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, 
the Netherlands and Portugal) and five from outside it (United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Sweden and Switzerland). The sample chosen is broad enough to cover about 60% of the total 
interbank lending by US banks, a percentage that increases to 80-90% for most euro-area national 
banking systems (Chart 1). Data have quarterly frequency from 2004Q1 to 2009Q3 (23 quarters for a 












AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT GB DK SE CH US
June 2006
June 2009
(1) Percentage ratio of the cross-border loans of each national banking system to the other 16 selected banking systems divided by the 
global cross-border interbank loans of that banking system.  
 
I used also a data set compiled with gross bilateral deposits lent by six leading Italian banks to each 
other and to 21 leading foreign banks; the series have monthly frequency from January 2004 to 
December 2009 (72 months for a total of 432 data points). Banks in this data set meet the following 
criteria: the six Italian banks are listed, the 21 foreign banks are in the Euribor panel and for each bank 
in both groups there is a liquid own 5-year CDS contract. Jointly taken, these criteria should ensure that 
these banks are all well established in financial markets; in addition, the CDS premium is used as an 
explanatory variable in the fits. Each of the 27 banks belongs to a different banking group, so that no 
intra-group dealing is involved.
10  
The sources of the various data sets used in the analysis are listed in Annex A, while the list of banks 
sampled in the micro data set is in Annex B. 
 
 
                                                 
9  Deposits are denominated in one of the five leading international currencies (US dollar, euro, British pound, Swiss Franc 
and Japanese yen) and converted into dollars at end-quarter exchange rates; data on Danish and Swedish banks include 
deposits denominated in the respective domestic currency. Ideally, had the appropriate data sets been available, it would 
have been useful to carry out separate analyses for different buckets of maturity (say, overnight deposits, other one-day 
deposits, time deposits up to 3 months, etc.).  
10  Using the more granular data of the e-MID trading platform, I double checked that each of the six selected Italian banks 
is the treasury bank of its own group.    9
2.2  The home bias indicator: algebra and measures 
Consider a simple world populated by 100 banks spread over two countries A and B in the proportion 
of 20 to 80. Each bank lends one unit of currency to its 99 counterparties, no matter what their country 
of origin, so that global interbank lending amounts to 9,900 units (=100×99). When data are aggregated 
at country level, one obtains the following representation: 
  
   Table  1 
              Borrowers 
 A  B  Sum 
A  380 
(20×19) 
1,600 
(20×80)  1,980 
B  1,600 
(80×20) 
6,320 
(80×79)  7,920 
Lenders 
Sum 1,980 7,920 9,900 
 
It would be misleading in terms of home bias to infer anything from the statistics that A banks direct 
19.2% of their interbank loans within their own country, a much lower share than B’s 79.8%, since by 
design in this world there is no specific preference for domestic banks. If this example supports the 
intuition that banks from larger countries tend to lend more domestically because they have more 
suitable counterparties, in the real world too a positive correlation can be established between the size 
of a banking system (as measured by the volume of its total interbank loans) and the associated ‘of 
which’ share of lending to domestic banks (Chart A.1). 
Instead, a more appropriate indicator of home bias would be one that adjusts for the size of the 
national banking system, as the international trade literature predicts that such size matters in trade 
flows (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). Moreover, this indicator should also highlight 
unambiguously whether banks in a given country lend more to their domestic counterparties than they 
ought to (positive home bias), ceteris paribus, or less (negative home bias). Using the above numerical 
example, this indicator should take positive values when domestic interbank lending in country A is 
more than 380 units (out of the total of 1,980). Finally, it renders all comparisons simpler if the 
indicator is normalized so that it takes value +1 if banks lends only domestically (maximum home bias) 
and -1 if they lend only overseas (minimum home bias).
11 
To set out the algebra of such an ideal indicator, let me introduce some notation. Consider a sample of 
n countries A, B, C, …, and let DA,B be the stock of loans granted by banks resident in A to those in B, 
DA,C that of loans from A to C and so on, while DA,A is the size of the domestic interbank market 
within A.
12 Symmetrically, DB,A is the stock of loans borrowed by A’s banks from B’s. Finally, DA,• and 
D•,A denote the total stock of interbank loans granted by and borrowed from the A banks (irrespective 
of the country of the counterparty) and D•,• is the total stock of interbank deposits exchanged among 
the banks in all n countries of the sample. The next step is to compile the n×n matrix of interbank 
lending (as a convention, I report the lending banking system row-wise and the borrowing one column-
wise). A standard formula of contingency tables suggests that amounts are evenly distributed across the 
table if, say, the figure in the B
th-row / C
th-column cell is equal to (DB,• × D•,C) / D•,•; it thus seems 
natural to assume that A’s banks display no home bias if DA,A = (DA,• × D•,A) / D•,• while there is 
                                                 
11  The recourse to a normalized home bias indicator taking value 0 if investors show no specific preference towards assets 
issued domestically is not new in the trade literature (Sørensen, Wu, Yosha and Zhu 2007 and Warnock 2002). The 
details of the algebra of the proposed indicator are adapted from Manna (2004). 
12  To keep matters simple, at this stage I do not explicitly introduce the time reference into the notation.    10
positive home bias if DA,A > (DA,• × D•,A) / D•,•. Finally, the total lending DA,• acts as a variable of scale 
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Where, of course, corresponding algebra can be used for the home bias of the banking system in B, C, 
etc. and the symbol ^ is only to highlight that, in fact, a variant of [1a] will eventually be used. It is 
straightforward to verify that  
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That is, while [1.a] takes the “correct” zero value in the neutral state and the associated positive and 
negative signs when appropriate, it does not hit the desired +1/-1 boundaries. A simple alternative is to 








A , , A











    













A , , A










A , , A


















        otherwise 
where x and y serve to obtain HBA = +1 and HBA = -1 when appropriate.
13 In fact, even [1.c] would 
benefit from a further adjustment relating to the number of banks populating each banking system.
14 
Since this is a minor refinement, I refer to Annex C for the related algebra and some results.  
The empirical work deals also with lending by individual banks and a suitable adaptation of [1.c] for 
micro data is: 
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a   
  
  , da,j (da,f) is the deposit 
lent by a to j (f), j being any Italian bank in the sample other than a itself, assetj is j’s total assets, f is for 
                                                 
13  The lower and upper boundaries [1.b.2] and [1.b.3] tend to be asymmetric around 0 (e.g. if DA,• = D•,A = 10 and D•,•. = 
100, then [1.b.2] yields 0.9 while [1.b.3] is -0.1. This requires y and x be different, though with only a negligible impact on 
the empirical analysis since the home bias is negative in just 1 out of the 391 data points of the aggregate dataset. 
14  Referring back to the example in Table 1, one could think of [1.c] as an approach where the elements along the main 
diagonal are derived as 2020 and 8080 (instead of the more correct products 2019 and 8079).   11
foreign. The intuition is about comparing the share of lending by bank a to its domestic counterparties 
out of its total interbank lending vis-à-vis the corresponding share under neutrality conditions. 
A set of descriptive statistics derived from [1.c] is in Table A.1. These include the average, minimum, 
maximum and standard deviation across the 23 quarters, a simple t-test on the change in the home bias 
indicator in 2007Q2 through 2009Q3, as well as the order of integration of these series. At the bottom 
of the table, summary results for the two areas are derived as weighted averages: 
 
[3.a] average home-bias indicator across 12 banking 
systems of the area 
[3.b] average home-bias indicator across the five non-area 
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The quarterly time series of formulae [3.a] for the euro area and [3.b] for the non-area countries are 
shown in Chart 2 and convey the gist of this paper. Before the crisis, the degree of home bias in the 
area was decreasing rapidly and converging to the levels of the five external banking systems. From 
mid-2007, the two trends decoupled: while the home bias of the area banking systems trended up again, 
the control benchmark continued to move downwards, albeit more irregularly. Arguably, the fact that 
the former trend bounces bank is correlated to the outbreak of the crisis. At the same time, the crisis 
alone cannot be the only culprit because no similar rebound is observed worldwide. In other words, 
there should be something specific in the way the crisis affected the cross-border interbank lending of 
euro-area banks that cannot be explained only through a generic reference to an increase in risk 
aversion or to the financial market turmoil. 
 
Chart 2 
Home bias indicator, summary results for the euro area and the five control countries (1) 



















(1) The two times series are obtained using [3.a] and [3.b]. 
 
This key result is upheld by two additional statistics. Firstly, the surge in the home bias in recent years is 
broad based: from mid-2007 onwards, indicator [1.c] rose in each of the twelve banking systems of the 
area and, based on the sort of t-statistics shown in Table A.1, in eight of the countries it did so 
significantly.
15 If anything, within-the-area trends became more homogeneous. As summary statistics, I 
ranked result [1.c] for the twelve euro banking systems at each quarter and then worked out the 
                                                 
15  On the contrary, the measured degree of home bias according to [1.c] fell in four of the five banking systems of the non-
area countries, Switzerland being the exception although starting from a very low basis.   12
difference between the third and the tenth measure: the resulting wedge narrowed from 0.27 points in 
2007Q1 to 0.22 in 2009Q3 (Chart 3). Secondly, the surge was due mainly to developments in within-
the-area cross-border transactions, in a proportion of around two thirds. This lends further support to 
the view that the roots of the enhanced preference for domestic counterparties should be sought in 
some feature of the area itself (Chart 4). 
 
Chart 3
Dispersion in the measures of home bias 
across euro-area national banking systems (1) 
(quarterly data) 
Chart 4 
Sources of change in the share of domestic 
interbank lending of euro-area national 
banking systems (2) 
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12   total change
  within-the-area cross-border
dep.s
  cross-border dep.s to outside
the area
  joint effect
2004Q1-2007Q1
2007Q1-2009Q3
(1) Third, sixth and tenth highest measure of the home bias at each quarter across the twelve euro-area banking systems based on [1.c]. – (2) 
The contribution of within-the-area cross-border deals has been obtained through [1.c], and in turn [3.a], on a parallel dataset where bilateral 
loans from euro-area banks to non-area ones are kept constant, in relative terms, to their 2004Q1 levels; switching roles, the same procedure 
has been followed to obtain the contribution of cross-border loans to non-area banks; the joint effect has been obtained as a residual. 
 
As to the micro data set, a handy summary statistic is the weighted average of [2] for the six selected 
Italian banks, following the same procedure adopted to yield [3.a] and [3.b] (Chart 5, results for 
individual banks are in Table A.2). A first finding is that until 2007 this statistic usually fluctuated in the 
range 0-0.4, with some occasional dips into negative territory (that is, in a few quarters these banks lent 
proportionally more deposits to banks outside Italy than to their domestic fellows). It is worth noting 
that even the upper boundary of this range is well below the lower boundary of the corresponding 
range for aggregated figures for the Italian banking system as a whole (0.6-0.8). This is in agreement 
with a well-known micro-structural element of the interbank market: bigger banks tend to carry out 
more cross-border transactions than medium-sized ones.
16 As an additional feature, the higher home 
bias emerges also from the micro data set, although the take-off point seems to be more mid-2008 (but 










                                                 
16  A word of caution is in order, although the aggregated and micro-based measures are related to each other, they are not 
fully comparable in their algebra.   13
Chart 5 
Average home bias of the six Italian banks in the micro data set (1) 








Jan 2004 Jan 2005 Jan 2006 Jan 2007 Jan 2008 Jan 2009 Jan 2010
 
(1) The time series has been obtained as the weighted average of [2], where weights are proportional to the total assets of each bank  
 
2.3   Some candidate explanatory variables of home bias  
One thing that is certain about the home bias is the wide range of values it takes across the various 
national banking systems, from 0.09 (average 2004Q1 through 2009Q3) for Belgium and 0.11 for 
Switzerland to 0.64 for the US, 0.69 for Austria and 0.70 for Italy (Table A.1 and Chart A.2). The fact 
that the level of the bias tends to be higher in some countries than in others can be ascribed to 
economic and financial key variables such as the openness of the economy, the size of its financial 
markets and the penetration of foreign banks in the national banking system. As empirical equivalent of 
these variables I use the following series: the sum of exports and imports of goods (a variant with both 
goods and services was also tried out with similar results), the capitalization of the domestic stock 
market, and the degree of penetration of foreign banks in the national banking system gauged by the 
difference between the total cross-border interbank lending by banks operating in a country and the 
like statistics derived from data consolidated at banking group level.
17 The country yearly GDP acted as 
a variable of scale. 
Across countries, the home bias is negatively correlated with all three series (Chart 6). For the purposes 
of the ensuing econometric analysis, it is important that the coefficients of correlations are large in 
absolute value (they take values from -0.30 down) and relatively stable over time, with some limited 
variability only in the correlation vis-à-vis the stock market / GDP ratio. It is also telling that no swings 
of significant size occurred in the series of the correlation coefficients at around mid-2007. This 
supports the interpretation that the increase in the euro-area home bias since 2007 was not brought 






                                                 
17  BIS data on locational (cross-border transactions between entities in different countries) and the twin consolidated 
banking statistics (cross-border transactions between entities of different banking groups) proved to be handy. 
18  The level of the home bias in a given country could also depend on the organization of the banking groups. The more 
the groups are fragmented into separate legal entities, the more the intra-group exchange o f  l i q u i d i t y  a d d s  t o  t h e  
measured turnover in the interbank market. In turn, this upward bias is likely to affect domestic trades proportionally 
more than cross-border ones as banking groups tend to consist of a larger number of entities in their own domestic turf. 
This hypothesis could not be verified directly due to the lack of suitable harmonized data sets for all seventeen countries 
(a point which is partly catered for by the micro data set; see fn. 33).   14
Chart 6 
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home bias & export-import goods / GDP
 
(1) The three time series are compiled using the coefficient of correlation, at each quarter, between the measure [1.c] of home bias of the 
seventeen banking systems in the sample and their country ratio to GDP of the penetration of foreign banks, the capitalization of the 
domestic stock market and the sum of imports and exports of goods.  
 
A scatter analysis of country-level data helps to identify the relative positions of the individual banking 
systems in terms of their home bias based on [1.c] and the three GDP ratios (Chart A.3). In each figure, 
dots below the trend line correspond to banking systems whose home bias is lower than predicted by, 
in turn, the country’s foreign trade, stock market capitalization and foreign banks’ penetration. Notably, 
when comparing the charts displaying 2009 data (right-hand column) with those with 2004 and 2007 
data (left-hand and central column), the dots corresponding to the non-area banking systems tend to 
shift south-west (with the notable exception of the US). Put plainly, in recent years the home bias of 
these banking systems has decreased compared with the average across the whole sample of seventeen 
banking systems, once the structure of these economies is taken into account.
19 
 
3.  A loan portfolio allocation model 
A loan portfolio optimisation model may yield insights into the way the “resolution edge” may affect 
the distribution of interbank loans. I consider a population of z risk-averse price-taker banks a, b, c, … 
distributed over n countries A, B, C, with at least two banks per country. Given two banks i and j, let 
i,jX denote the circumstance that both are from country X. Each bank solves a portfolio allocation 
problem to maximize its expected utility from lending a total of one unit of wealth (the budget 
constraint) across the other t-1 participants, where αi,j is the weight of the loan by i to j, no short 
positions are allowed and the entire initial wealth is invested: 
[4]  αi,j  0  for i,j = a, b, c, ..   where αi,i = 0 and  1
z
1 j
j , i   

 for every i  
The expected return of the loan granted by i to j depends on the exogenous market interest rate m, the 
probability of default (PD) πi,j of j as assessed by i, as well as a recovery ratio ri,j if j defaults. To keep the 
model as flexible as possible, πi,j and ri,j are written out in a way that caters for the alternatives that i to j 
are from the same country or not. Starting off with πi,j, this is conceived as the sum of a baseline 
component πj, which is invariant to such alternative, and a second component which conversely takes 
different values depending on whether j is domestic to i or not. One may think of them as, respectively, 
a score gauged from publicly-available information on traded instruments (say, the premium on j’s 
                                                 
19  This is not an obvious result as the UK and US economies in particular have been hard hit by the crisis.   15
CDS), which is invariant to the distance between i and j, and a premium σ which, for the sake of 
prudence, i adds to the consensus assessment on j if he is aware that he may lack some information (e.g. 
that circulated by word of mouth) or may not be able to fully exploit that available.
20 For the sake of 
simplicity, the latter component enters the summation through a binomial parameter δi,j which is 1 if 
i,j X and 0 otherwise: 
[5]  πi,j = πj+ δi,j σ     where πj and σ(0,1),  δi,j = 1 if i,jX and 0 otherwise 
Along a similar (but reverse) structure, the recovery ratio ri,j is conceived as the sum of a baseline 
component r, homogeneous across all pairs i and j, plus an additional component k if the two banks are 
from the same country: 
[6] ri,j = r + λi,j k     where r(0,1),  k(0,1-r], > 0,  λi,j = 1 if i,j  X and 0 otherwise. 
The agent’s optimization problem is solved analytically through an HARA utility function with γ = 2:  
[7]  max U = 0.5 (p x – q)
2 
 where       

      
z
1 j
j , i j , i j , i j , i r 1 m 1 x , p, q > 0  
constraints [4] apply and parameters p and q are both strictly positive; the larger p is relative to q, the 
more risk averse is the investor. Compared with other utility function, the quadratic specification 
should yield more balanced portfolio solutions (Chadha and Schellekens 1999). 
To keep the algebra tractable, this maximization problem can be tackled for the case where z = 3, 
which caters for the basic choice between a domestic and a foreign counterparty, say, a lends to b and c 
in the proportion of α and 1-α, where a,bX and a,cX. Referring the reader to Table A.3 and 
Annex D for additional details, the solution  ˆ  of [7], the optimal share of domestic lending
21, is  
[8]             
   
2
c , a b , a
2
c , a b , a
2
c , a b , a
c , a b , a c , a b , a c , a b , a
k m 1 k r 1 r m 1 1 p
r m 1 q r p 1 k q r p k r m 1 q m p p 1
ˆ
              
                  
   
It is straightforward to verify that if k = 0 and πa,b = πa,c, [8] yields  ˆ = 0.5 always: a treats b and c 
equally (and there is no reason why it should do otherwise) when these two banks do not differ in 
terms of the recovery ratio and probability of default. Taking partial derivatives  
[9a]  
 0 0 k ˆ
b , a c , a
  
   

  
[9b]   0 ˆ
k




where [8a] shows that  ˆ  increases with the relative riskiness of c to b (as assessed by a) as well as with 
the “resolution edge” k.  
                                                 
20   Freixas and Holtahusen (2004) draw a model of interbank market integration whose key assumption is that cross-border 
information about banks is less precise than home country information. 
21  In this setting, banks are endowed with same initial wealth (one unit) and they all choose between an equal number of 
domestic and foreign counterparties (one each in this instance). As a result, the share α of domestic lending is as good a 
measure of the home bias as the more advanced indicator [1.c].   16
To derive reasonable calibrations of the model, I set out assuming  ˆ equal to 68 or 75%, i.e. the share 
of domestic interbank lending in the euro area at 2007Q1 and 2009Q2 respectively. The ratio between 
the parameters p and q of the utility function is set at 0.67 and 0.83, corresponding to instances of lower 
and higher risk aversion. The market interest rate m is equal to 1%, in line with the then ECB policy 
rate, bank b’s PD at 0.6% and the baseline component r of the recovery ratio at 40%, which is an 
industry standard. Based on these assumptions, one can find the locus of solutions of the pairs {πa,c / 
πa,b ; k} which yields [8] for different combinations of  ˆ  and of the ratio p/q (Charts 7a-b).  
A first finding is that the resulting lines are negatively sloped: there is a trade-off between higher 
relative levels of riskiness of foreign banks and more “resolution edge” in obtaining a given level of 
domestic interbank lending. Secondly, when  ˆ = 75% (right-hand chart), solution lines lie above and to 
the right compared with those for  ˆ = 68% (left-hand chart): our representative risk-averse agent 
accepts to deviate from the fifty-fifty neutral allocation only against the backdrop of more riskiness of 
foreign banks (as measured by the ratio πa,c / πa,b), more “edge” k or both. Note that the more a is risk 
averse, the larger do both the ratio πa,c / πa,b and k need to be in order to achieve a given level of  ˆ , as 
suggested by the fact that in the two charts line (2), corresponding to higher values of the ratio p/q, lies 
above and to the right of line (1).  
 
Charts 7a-b 
Simulations of the model: the relationship between credit risk and k, given  and risk aversion (1)




























(1) low risk aversion





























(1) low risk aversion
(2) high risk aversion
(1) The lines on the left-hand chart describe the solutions that verify [7] for  ˆ = 68%, m = 1%, r = 40%, πa,b = 0.6% and p / q = 0.67 in 
line (1) and p / q = 0.83 in line (2). The same sets of parameters are used in the right-hand chart except  ˆ = 75%. 
 
A second and even more noticeable finding is that the intercepts of the various lines with the vertical 
axis do provide acceptable solutions of [8] with k = 0. However, such solutions imply stringent 
requirements on the other parameters of the model: for example, when  ˆ = 75%, as in 2009, the ratio 
πa,c / πa,b needs to be in the order of 1.5 when risk aversion is relatively low and 1.9 when risk aversion 
increases. What is the likelihood that foreign banks are so much riskier than domestic ones? To gather 
some insights, I looked into a data set of monthly measures of the expected default frequency (EDF) of 
the banks in the Euribor panel, which I subdivided according to whether the bank is from the euro area 
or not.
22 The median value of the EDFs across the two sub-groups in 2009 was respectively 0.40% and 
0.39% for the euro-area and non-euro-area banks, so that the resulting ratio πa,c / πa,b is well below the 
1.5 threshold (in fact, it is even marginally lower than 1). In turn, this implies that real-world data bear 
out a solution close to the intercept along the horizontal axis, that is with k in the order of 15-20%.  
                                                 
22  The data set included 30 banks, of which 22 from the euro area.   17
Before calling the case closed in favour of a non-negligible k, there remains the tricky task of 
establishing a quantitative measure of the parameter σ from proposition [5]. Exploiting again the EDF 
data, I considered the following rule of thumb: a risk-averse agent measures the EDF of fellow banks 
using the median value of the distribution while, in a conservative approach, he relies on a higher 
percentile for foreign counterparties. Proceeding in a reverse way, I thus managed to get results for πa,b 
and πa,c that stand in the desired 1.5 ratio when πa,c is taken on the 66
th percentile, while the 1.9 ratio 
requires the procedure to escalate to the 70
th. To put numbers in perspective, this implies that a euro-
area bank in the Euribor panel may classify 4 out of its 22 fellow area banks in the panel as less risky 
than the median non-area bank from the panel, on the grounds of commonality, although the available 
EDFs would point to the opposite conclusion. 
In fact, the model suggests that changes in the value of  ˆ from 68% to 75% may be achieved without 
foreign banks suddenly becoming that much riskier. In Chart 8, line (1) identifies a locus of solutions 
for the ratios πa,c / πa,b and p/q which resembles pre-crisis conditions. Line (2) is the new line obtained 
once  ˆ  goes up to 75%, while m is kept constant at 5% and k is omitted. The new equilibrium requires 
a substantially higher πa,c / πa,b ratio when the crisis unfolds, which real-world data from the Euribor 
panel do not seem to confirm. However, if simulations are re-run with m = 1% one obtains line (3), 
where the increase in the πa,c / πa,b ratio is cut by around one third. Finally, if one adds k = 4%, the 
resulting line (4) overlaps the starting line (1). The tale of these simulations is that the higher share of 
domestic interbank may be described by the model, once stock is taken of the decline in interbank 
interest rates and one accepts a small dose of k. The resulting rather narrow wedge between the 
baseline 40% component of the recovery ratio and its overall 44% value for the domestic investor may 
perhaps help to reconcile the actual patterns in home bias¸ the “resolution edge” hypothesis and some 


























 = 68%, k=0%, m=5%
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(1) The four lines describe the locus of solution of the ratios . (a,c) /  (a,b) and p/q coherent with the specified values of parameters , k 
and m (r = 40% in all examples), given [8]. 
 
The joint impact of the various forces at play – the structural variables driving the level of home bias, 
banks’ riskiness, risk aversion, market interest rates and the recovery ratio – may be assessed through a 
linearized version of [8]: 
[10] HBi,t = θ0 + θ1 Xi,t + θ2 (π
F – π
D)i,t + θ3 risk_aversioni,t + θ4 mt + θ5 k + ui,t    18
where Xi,t is the matrix where the structural variables examined in Section 2.3 (the ratio to GDP of the 
sum of exports and imports, foreign banks’ penetration, stock market capitalization) are stacked in, 
while (π
F – π
D) is the spread in riskiness between foreign and domestic banks. Against this framework, 
the main issue raised in the introduction – the crisis would have magnified the “resolution edge” in 
cross-border transactions across the euro area while it had a smaller impact on those transactions 
originated by banks from the control countries – can be tested by checking whether the estimate of the 
k coefficient increased after the start of the crisis significantly more when i is a banking system from a 
euro-area country than otherwise. 
 
4.  The econometric analysis 
4.1   The analysis of the aggregated banking system data 
The fits on the aggregated banking-system-level (country) data on the determinants of home bias were 
run on the following baseline function: 
[11] HBi,t = β0 + β1 Xi,t + β2 (π
F – π
D)i,t + β3 risk_aversiont + β4 dummyi,t + β5 trendt + ui,t  
              i = 1, ..,17; t = 2004Q1, .., 2009Q3 (23 quarters) 
which differs from the preliminary model-based specification [10] as it omits the market interest rate m 
while it includes a trend variable. The former (measured by one-year Euribor) was not generally 
employed in the fits due to its correlation, in the order of 0.50, with measures of risk aversion (see 
next), while the latter caters for the decreasing trend visible e.g. in Chart 2, were this not wholly 
captured by other explanatory variables.
23  
In running the fits, Xi,t included at most two of the three GDP ratios described in Section 2.3 at a time, 
again to fend off possible multicollinearity.
24 The spread in the two probability-of-default π’s 
parameters was proxied by the premium on the 5-year CDS on, respectively, an average of foreign 
sovereign issuers and own sovereign issuers.
25 For example, given country 1 in the sample from 1 to 17, 
the former was worked out as the average of this premium on countries 2 to 16.
26  
As to the market risk aversion item, a number of time series were examined: (1) Euribor – Overnight 
Index Swap (OIS) spread at the one-year maturity, a standard in empirical studies on the money market 
during the crisis
27; (2) a measure of the premium on the liquidity risk inferred from the Euribor index; 
(3) an index of global risk aversion, obtained as a normalized weighted average of various measures of 
volatility of widely traded financial instruments, and (4) an estimate of expected losses on banks in the 
Euribor panel, inferred from the OIS spread and the premium on their own 5-year CDS (Chart A.4).
28 
Note that while all such measures tell us something about the more tense conditions in the money 
market during the crisis, they do so from different angles: the spread and the premium relate to the 
quantity of (market) liquidity risk, the index is a general measure of risk aversion, and the final estimate 
                                                 
23  A possible economic interpretation of this downward trend is the push to trade more cross-border due to the global 
integration of financial markets. Additionally, as the process of consolidation makes inroad in the banking system, top 
banks need to look more and more abroad to find adequate peers for their trading. 
24  The average of the coefficients of correlation between the country measures of the stock market to GDP ratio and the 
export + import to GDP ratio was measured at 0.50. 
25  Levy and Zaghini (2010) show that during the crisis the cost of the (guaranteed) debt taken on by banks was correlated 
to the riskiness of their own country. The alternative of measuring PDi,t on some average of CDS premiums on banks 
looked less robust since in some countries of the sample liquid CDS contracts are available only for a few banks and any 
summary statistic is bound to take on idiosyncratic factors. 
26  Both linear and weighted (using as weights at time t the country breakdown in the volume of cross-border deposits lent 
at time t-1 by i’s banks) averages were examined, with no meaningful differences. 
27  Results changes very little if Libor is used in lieu of Euribor. 
28  Data for the series (2) and (4) are from Nobili (2009).   19
is about the quantity of credit risk. Overall, they should cater for a fairly complete representation of the 
various facets of strains in the interbank market during the crisis. 
The dummy variable is a 23×17 matrix filled in with 1s in quarters from 2007Q2 onwards in the 
columns corresponding to i being a banking system from the euro area and 0 otherwise (a vector 
representation was also tried out; see below).  
Pooled estimates of [11] were run with cross-section SUR weights, a feasible GLS specification which 
corrects for cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation, both on levels and on 
first differences, with and without cross-section fixed effects. The expected signs of the estimated 
coefficients are as follows: β1 < 0, owing to the negative correlations shown in Chart 6; β2 < 0, from 
derivative [9a]; β3 > 0, as gauged from the above simulations of the model; β4 > 0, this is the 
“resolution edge” hypothesis; and β5 < 0, from the downwards trend in Chart 2. Selected results are in 
Table A.4.
29  
Overall, the chosen specifications yield an adequate explanatory power, with an adjusted R
2 (weighted) 
in the range of 0.95-0.99 and highly significant F tests. Residuals look reasonably well-behaved both in 
terms of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity structure; a token graphical representation is in Chart 
A.5. In the selected fits, estimated coefficients are mostly significantly different from zero at 1% 
probability and take the expected sign. One relevant exception concerns β3, which in some but not all 
fits is significantly higher than zero.
30  
As regards the overall robustness of the analysis, reassuringly, the results of the different fits differ only 
marginally depending on whether one or the other time series of the structure of the economy and of 
the interbank market strains are considered. Crucially, the results for the dummy variable suggest that, 
having controlled for developments in the other explanatory variables, the level of home bias of euro-
area banks was higher by some 0.1-0.2 than the home bias of non-euro countries from mid-2007. This 
increase is not only statistically significant but is also non-negligible in absolute value as the average 
level of the indicator itself is close to 0.4-0.5 with a standard deviation in the order of 0.05 (Table A.1).  
The dummy was tested also in the form of a 23×1 matrix (a vector), this time imposing cross-specific 
restrictions on the related coefficient so as to obtain 17 estimates β4,i: when i is a euro-area country, 9 
out of 12 such estimates turned out significantly above zero, while the ratio when i is a non-euro 
country falls to 1 out of 5 (the US being the only exception).  
Further, fits were tried with and without fixed effects, tested using an F-family test, and the impact of 
their inclusion can be gauged by comparing columns (l.7) and (l.8) of Table [A.4] in the specification 
that uses the goods / GDP ratio and the Euribor-OIS spread.
31 All estimates confirm their signs and 
overall no large explanatory power is added (bear in mind that the more parsimonious version without 
fixed effects already achieved an R
2 of 0.99) but noticeably the estimated coefficient β4 of the k 
parameter decreases from 0.17 to 0.06. Incidentally, the latter figure is not far above the 4% examined 
in the simulations of the analytical model (Chart 8).  
Likewise, when estimates are run on the first differences ΔHBi,t in the home bias indicator,
32 there is a 
systematic quarter-on-quarter increase in the measure of home bias by euro-area banks compared with 
their non-euro country peers in the order of 0.02 (Table A.5). This yields a cumulative amount of 
around 0.2 in the ten quarters from 2007Q2 through 2009Q3, matching the results on the level. 
 
 
                                                 
29   Additional results are available on request. 
30   This may signal the difficulty of measuring the riskiness of a banking system as a whole on the basis of publicly available 
market-based measures. 
31   Fits were also run with seasonal effects, without meaningful changes in results. 
32   Most individual national series of this indicator are integrated of order 1 (Table [A.1]).    20
4.2   The analysis of the individual banks data  
Based on the model put forward in section 2.2, the dummy variable employed in the fits of [11] could 
be related to the “resolution edge” parameter k or to the premium σ which is meant to capture less 
accurate information on foreign banks (or both). Given the economic rationale for the latter 
component – some news may be passed on by word of mouth and locals are better equipped to extract 
information from news that is otherwise publicly available – it seems to be a tall order to have a time 
series of σ to be used directly in standard econometric fits. As an alternative route, the micro data set 
introduced in Section 2.1 is compiled using data on deposits exchanged among banks in the Euribor 
panel, hopefully so as to minimize any unevenness in information due to borders. Hence, the premium 
σ should carry only a smaller weight, if any.
33 
That said, the baseline model fit with pooled techniques on monthly data on individual loans is: 
[12] hbj,t = γ0 + γ1 XITALY,t + γ2 (πt
F – πt
D,j) + γ3 risk_aversiont + γ4 dummyt + ui,t  
              j = 1, ..,6; t = 2004JAN, .., 2009DIC (72 months) 
where the dependent variable is the home bias of the j-th Italian bank in the sample, XITALY,t follows on 
from above remarks with the proviso that only the time series for Italy are considered, πt
F is the average 
of the premium on the 5-year CDS from end-month t over the 21 non-Italian banks in the sample, πt
D,j 
is the corresponding average over the 5 Italian banks other than bank j itself, risk_ aversion takes the 
meaning introduced above and the dummy variable takes value 1 from June 2007 onwards and 0 
otherwise. No trend variable is introduced because of the high correlation with the dummy. 
Fits were run using Pooled IV/Two-stage EGLS (Cross-section SUR).
34 Selected fits on [12] are shown 
in Table [A.6] and refer to the level hbj,t measure of the indicator (no results were selected for the 
model on the first difference Δhbj,t in which the explanatory power model did not prove to be 
adequate
35). Fits (b.1) through (b.6) mirror like specifications examined in the macro data, while (b.7) 
and (b.8) are somewhat different and will be commented below. 
As to fits (b.1)-(b.6), estimates mostly take the expected sign although not all of them are significantly 
different from zero. Across the board, the overall explanatory power of the fits is lower than in the 
aggregate estimates, a finding which is conceivably due to the larger idiosyncratic component that 
almost unavoidably affects individual banks’ data compared with aggregated data. That being 
acknowledged, home bias increases the wider the spread in average CDS premiums between foreign 
and domestic (Italian) banks. It remains confirmed that the dummy adds a significantly positive 
contribution to the level of home bias. In fit (b.7) I introduced the dummy also in a multiplicative way 
before the risk spread and virtually no difference emerged in the result.  
Put more simply, the creditworthiness of available counterparties became a staple of the lending 
decision in the interbank market when the crisis broke out. This result looks consistent with the 
findings of Angelini, Nobili and Picillo (2009) and Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2009). In fit (b.8) I split 
the average premiums on the CDS of Italian counterparties from that of foreign banks, where both 
series are pre-multiplied by the dummy. The estimated coefficients of the two products keep the 
expected signs (respectively, negative and positive) and are comparable in absolute terms. The news is 
that while the foreign component πt
F is statistically different from zero, the domestic item πt
D,j is not. 
                                                 
33   It is worth adding that the loans surveyed in this data set are exchanged by banks of different banking groups, i.e. no 
intra-group transfers of liquidity are involved. 
34  This specification does not allow a direct F test on the fixed effects. A way round was to re-run the fits without fixed 
effects while introducing cross-section restrictions on the constant (this yields the same results except for a shift between 
the estimated coefficient of the constant in the former specification and the average of the country results in the latter) 
and then conducting an F test on whether all cross-specific constants are nil. 
35   One should bear in mid that only three out of the six time series of the individual home bias are integrated of order 1, 
while the other three are integrated of order 0.    21
This is a noteworthy difference given that no dramatic differences arise in the riskiness of Italian and 
foreign banks in the sample, as measured by the CDS premiums (Chart A.6). Thus, the issue seems to 
lie with the way banks weigh on this input, which seems to matter less when the counterparty under 
assessment is a domestic fellow bank. It is tempting to read this finding as a further hint of the 
“resolution edge”: from the point of view of the lender, domestic counterparties would be deemed 
intrinsically less risky for reasons that go beyond measures based on standard approaches. 
When significantly different from zero, the estimated coefficient γ3 of the risk aversion proxies is 
negative. Finally, the estimate of γ4 of the additive dummy variables takes the expected positive sign. 
That is, after having controlled for the variables now described, there remains a significant component 
of extra increase in the home bias of Italian banks in the interbank market. 
Arguably, this is just a cut of the euro-area interbank market, insofar as it is about the lending 
behaviour of six leading Italian banks and ideally one would like to run similar tests on data relating to 
loans granted by banks from other countries as well. Two elements suggest, however, that the results 
now presented may have a more general bearing. First, the average home bias of these six banks (Chart 
5) appears consistent with a number of other statistics examined throughout the paper. Hence, the six 
banks would appear to be a reasonably representative sample from the broader pool of large euro 
banks. Second, the measures enacted in Italy to support the banking system throughout the crisis were 
certainly not massive compared with those adopted in other developed countries, both in terms of 
commitments and outlays (Panetta et al. 2009). If anything, this suggests that in other countries banks 
should have perceived an even larger advantage in lending to their domestic counterparties as a way of 
eschewing credit losses. Hence, fits of [12] on similar micro data sets for such countries should return 
even stronger results for the dummy. 
 
5.  Concluding remarks  
According to one indicator – taking values between -1 when banks lends only cross-border and +1 
when they lend only domestically, with 0 signalling no specific preference towards domestic 
counterparties – the interbank lending home bias of banks based in 12 euro-area countries (the starting 
members of the Monetary Union plus Greece) fell from 0.57 in 2004Q1 to 0.45 in 2007Q2, bouncing 
back to 0.56 in 2009Q3. For the same dates, the corresponding bias of banks from the five non-euro 
countries (US, UK, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland) moved downwards from 0.43, to 0.41 and then 
0.37. What emerges is a decoupling in trends at the outbreak of the current ongoing crisis between the 
banks’ home bias in the two sets of countries. Two additional patterns are worth noting: first, these 
trends are broad based, with the bias rising in all 12 euro banking systems while decreasing in 4 out of 5 
non-area systems; second, the upward slope of the area banks’ bias was due mainly to developments in 
within-the-area cross-border interbank deals. 
Having provided statistical evidence describing these facts, the second part of the research set out to 
seek the underlying causes. On a cross-section dimension, the drivers of the country-level interbank 
home bias are identified in a trio of series meant to gauge the openness of the economy, the size of its 
financial market and the penetration of foreign banks in the national banking system. While this is not 
necessarily an exhaustive list and additional variables (or alternative specifications of the same variables) 
could be tried out, an R
2 in the order of 95% in the fits of the level of the home bias indicator suggests 
that nothing really big has been left out of the picture.  
As to the time dimension, a number of candidate explanatory items have been examined. The 
econometric fits control for heightened market strains using four alternative spreads / indicators 
inferred from interbank market interest rates. Yet, even accounting also for the aforementioned drivers, 
as well as a spread in creditworthiness of foreign vis-à-vis domestic banks and a trend variable, there 
remains a significant unexplained increase in the bias of euro banks from the onset of the crisis.    22
A number of educated guesses can be made regarding the rationale of this residual component. To start 
with, one could relate it to the information advantage a bank may have on its fellow domestic banks 
regarding foreign ones, where the heightened uncertainty clouding market developments during the 
crisis should have widened this advantage. Hence, the finding of more home bias could be interpreted 
as the rational behaviour of a risk averse agent. However, this argument looks at odd with both a logical 
and an empirical element. First, increasing heterogeneity in information should have created a similar 
incentive for the banks from the non-euro countries, while their home bias actually decreased further in 
the most recent years. Second, the rise in home bias is also detected in an ancillary micro data set 
compiled with interbank loans exchanged across banks in the Euribor panel, that is banks which are 
well established in financial markets and on which domestic peers are less likely to have any specific 
information advantage compared with foreign big banks. 
Exploiting the large literature on home bias in international finance, another obvious candidate 
explanation is represented by FX market volatility. Alas, most of the cross-border interbank lending by 
euro-area banks takes place within the area and involves euro-denominated deposits. If anything, 
concerns about exchange rate risks should have prompted a rise in the home bias of banks from the 
control countries, more than the other way around. 
Another recurring item in this literature concerns the cost of trading internationally. If this is taken 
literally, and thus in term of the fees due in trading deposits through the single settlement platform 
TARGET2, one could hardly make a case for lending more to domestic banks than to other banks 
within the area from 2007 on. I therefore suggest a broader interpretation of the trading cost item, 
which includes also the advantage of being a creditor when your embattled borrower is a fellow 
domestic bank, the “resolution edge”. National authorities could be tempted to decide more favourably 
whether or not to rescue a bank, the larger the share of domestic creditors; if they eventually decide to 
intervene, they could design the support operation in a way that shelters domestic creditors better than 
foreign ones. Even when none of these elements plays a role, creditors may feel uneasy about claiming 
their rights before a foreign regulatory and legal jurisdiction. 
The crux of the matter is not that the “resolution edge” is necessarily higher within the area than 
outside it. Rather, the issue lies with its dynamics: before the crisis, banks (especially large ones) 
increasingly regarded a cross-border within-the-area transaction as tantamount to a domestic one in 
terms of legal risk, with the plus that the former allowed more diversification across borrowers; 
afterwards, banks reckoned that overall risk considerations were significantly advantageous for the 
domestic creditor compared with the foreign one. From this standpoint, the outbreak of the crisis was 
less of a watershed for banks operating from the non-euro countries: say, a large Swiss bank did not 
need to wait until 2007 to appreciate the difference between running a business in Zürich and in New 
York. 
To conclude, when looking for the smoking gun, at the current stage the lack of suitable data makes it 
impossible to test directly the link between home bias and “resolution edge” and due caution should be 
used even when this link appears consistent with a number of data and anecdotal findings. Arguably, 
and this creates an agenda for future research, any competing hypothesis on the interbank lending 
home bias needs to cater simultaneously for the V-shaped pattern of the bias of euro-area banks and 
the more consistent downward trend of non-euro-area banks throughout the crisis. It should also be of 
definite interest to examine whether, over time, the strength of the “resolution edge” disappears in 
cross-border transactions within the area; or, as traders become accustomed to it, the extent to which it 
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ADDITIONAL TABLES AND CHARTS 
(the order of presentation follows their reference in the text) 
 
Chart A.1 
Correlation between the share of domestic interbank loans by 17 national banking systems and 








2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
(1) The time series shown in the chart is compiled with the correlation, at each data point (each quarter), between the share of domestic 
interbank lending in the total for the 17 banking systems in the sample and the weight of their interbank lending (both domestic and 
foreign) in the total of the sample. 
 
        Table A.1
Home bias indicator, country results, summary statistics (1) 
(quarterly data, 2004_Q1-2009_Q3) 





Euro-area banking systems 
Austria  0.69 0.60 0.79 0.05  2.6  I(1) 
Belgium 0.09  -0.10  0.17  0.05  1.7  I(1) 
Germany  0.50 0.46 0.54 0.02  2.4  I(1) 
Spain  0.58 0.49 0.67 0.05  0.8  I(1) 
Finland  0.34 0.28 0.43 0.04  1.7  I(1) 
France  0.56 0.48 0.64 0.05  2.1  I(1) 
Greece  0.38 0.24 0.58 0.10  2.3  I(1) 
Ireland  0.40 0.34 0.49 0.04  1.7  I(1) 
Italy  0.70 0.66 0.78 0.04  3.3  I(1) 
Luxembourg  0.25 0.20 0.38 0.05  2.3  I(2) 
Netherlands  0.12 0.08 0.21 0.04  3.2  I(2) 
Portugal  0.36 0.29 0.48 0.05  3.3  I(1) 
Banking systems of the non-euro-area countries 
Great  Britain  0.15 0.02 0.25 0.07  -1.5  I(1) 
Denmark  0.26 0.23 0.32 0.02  0.2  I(0) 
Sweden  0.19 0.15 0.30 0.04  -1.7  I(1) 
Switzerland  0.11 0.07 0.15 0.03  2.0  I(1) 
USA  0.64 0.59 0.70 0.03  -1.3  I(1) 
Summary results for the two areas 
Euro  area  0.48 0.43 0.54 0.04  2.6  I(1) 
Non-euro-area countries  0.38 0.31 0.43 0.03  -1.0  I(1) 




        Table A.2
Home bias indicator, individual banks’ results, summary statistics (1) 
(monthly data, 2004_JAN - 2009_DEC) 





Bank A  0.24  -0.99  0.86  0.46  1.0  I(1) 
Bank B  0.24  -0.77  0.99  0.43  2.2  I(1) 
Bank C  0.17  -1.00  0.99  0.55  0.6  I(0) 
Bank D  0.10  -1.00  0.98  0.61  -1.0  I(0) 
Bank E  0.37  -0.22  0.94  0.27  -0.5  I(0) 
Bank F  0.29  -0.54  0.78  0.23  2.6  I(1) 
Total 0.23  -0.35  0.66  0.19  1.4  I(0) 
(1) Results are obtained on the basis of [2]. The level of integration is derived using ADF tests, at 1% probability. Banks A-F 
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Chart A.2 
Home bias indicator, individual country results (1) 
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Home bias vis-à-vis stock market capitalization, foreign banks’ penetration and foreign 
merchandisetrade: Results for individual countries 
(average of quarterly data over the year specified) (1) 
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(1) In the charts, on the left-hand column, the x-coordinate is the average over the four quarters of 2004 of the specified 
GDP ratio at country level and the y-coordinate is the average over the same quarter of [1.c]. Charts in the middle and on 









Outcome of lending when z = 3 banks (1) 
Outcome Return  Probability 
Both b and c pay  1 + m  (1-πa,b)  (1-πa,c) 
b pays, c defaults  α (1+m) + (1-α) r  (1- πa,b)  πa,c 
b defaults, c pays  α (r+k) + (1-α) (1+m)  πa,b (1- πa,c) 
Both b and c default  α (r+k) + (1-α) r  πa,b πa,c 
(1) The table describes the possible outcomes of the loans by a to b and c in the proportion of α and 
1-α.; m is the market interest rate, r and k form the recovery ratio, πa,b and πa,c are the probability of 
































Sources: BIS, ECB, national central bank websites, Datastream, Nobili (2009) and author’s calculations. 
(1) The Euribor-OIS spread refers to contracts denominated in euros at 1-year maturity, the index of global risk aversion is a normalized 
weighted average of various measures of volatility of widely-traded financial instruments; the measure of expected loss refers to banks in the 
Euribor panel and is inferred from CDS premiums; the measure of liquidity risk is inferred from the Euribor-OIS spread and CDS 














Fits on aggregated data on home bias (levels) 
HBi,t = β0 + β1 Xi,t + β2 (π
F – π
D)i,t + β3 risk_aversiont + β4 dummyi,t + β5 trendt + ui,t 
 (quarterly series; t = 2004Q1 to 2009Q3 for 23 observations; i = 1 to 17 countries; fixed effects apply unless specified otherwise) 
  (l.1) (l.2) (l.3) (l.4) (l.5) (l.6) (l.7) (l.8) 
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 R 2 adj. (weighted /unweighted) 0.96/0.99 0.95/0.99 0.95/0.99 0.97/0.99 0.97/0.99 0.99/0.99 0.99/0.99 0.99/0.99 
 D.W. 1.73 1.72 1.71 1.70 1.71 1.75 1.76 1.87 
  F-test on overall fit 1,663 **  1,552 **  1,522 **  2,355 **  2,358 **  9,560 **  9,562 **  3,967 ** 
  F-test on fixed effects  without fixed effects  2,785 ** 
Pooled EGLS (cross-section SUR) estimates. White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). Standard errors in parentheses. */** estimates are significant at 5% and 
1% level. The estimated coefficient of the relative risk spread and of the trend are multiplied by 100. The redundant fixed-effect test is about the hypothesis that the estimated fixed 








































































































































Fits on aggregated data on home bias (first differences) 
Δ HBi,t = β0 + β1 Δ Xi,t + β2 Δ (π
F – π
D)i,t + β3 Δ risk_aversiont + β4 dummyi,t + ui,t 
 (quarterly series; t = 2004Q2 to 2009Q3 for 22 observations; i = 1 to 17 countries; with fixed effects) 
  (d.1) (d.2) (d.3) (d.4) (d.5) (d.6) (d.7) 
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 R 2 adj. (weighted /unweighted) 0.41/0.99 0.42/0.99 0.45/0.99 0.35/0.99 0.35/0.99 0.40/0.99 0.45/0.99 
  F-test on overall fit 12.3 **  12.6 **  14.9 **  9.6 **  9.8 **  13.7 **  14.3** 
  F-test on fixed effects  3.39 **  3.40 **  3.35 **  3.24 **  3.24 **  3.53 **  3.54 ** 
Pooled IV/Two-stage EGLS (Cross-section SUR) estimates. White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). Standard errors in parentheses. */** 
estimates are significant at 5% and 1% level. Estimated coefficients are multiplied by 10, those of relative risk and market risk by 1000. Δ is the difference operator which 






Fits on data on individual banks' home bias (levels) 
hbj,t = γ0,j + γ1 XITALY,t + γ2 (πt
F – πt
D,j) + γ3 risk_aversiont + γ4 dummyt + ui,t 
(monthly series; t = 2004_Jan to 2009_Dec for 72 monthly observations, i = 1 to 6 banks; with fixed effects) 
  (b.1) (b.2) (b.3) (b.4) (b.5) (b.6) (b.7) (b.8) 
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 R 2 adj. (weighted /unweighted) 0.09/0.83 0.11/0.84 0.11/0.84 0.04/0.81 0.11/0.83 0.13/0.84 0.13/0.84 0.17/0.85 
  F-test on overall fit 8.2 **  8.4 **  5.1**  6.7 **  8.6 **  8.9 **  8.9 **  9.3 ** 
  F-test on fixed effects  7.7 **  6.1 **  7.9 **  3.5 **  6.4 **  7.2 **  7.2 **  5.6 ** 
Pooled EGLS (cross-section SUR) estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. */** estimates are significant at 5% and 1% level. The estimated coefficient of the relative risk spread and 












Premiums on 5-year CDS on Italian and non-Italian banks in the Euribor panel 
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ANNEX A  The sources of the data 
 
Data on interbank deposits 
Cross-border interbank lending at banking system level 
  BIS locational statistics: http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm; quarterly data on international 
financial claims and liabilities of bank offices in the reporting country 
  BIS consolidated banking statistics http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm; quarterly lending and 
borrowing by the head office and all its branches and subsidiaries on a worldwide consolidated basis 
Domestic interbank lending at banking system level 
  ECB, national aggregated balance-sheets of the MFI sector, tem 1.1.1, 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/aggregates/bsheets/html/outstanding_amounts_2009-06.en.html; lending 
from euro-area monetary financial institutions (MFIs) located in the euro area to euro-area MFIs located in 
the euro area, where the Eurosystem is excluded on both the lending and borrowing side. In general, the 
concept of MFIs covers credit institutions (which for most practical purposes coincide with the “banks” 
considered by the BIS) and money market funds 
  US Federal Reserve: http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coreprinciples/default.htm, average 
daily volume of transfers in Fedwire, 
  Bank of England: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb/NewIntermed.asp. Monthly outstanding 
amount of UK resident banks' (excl. central bank) sterling loans to UK resident banks (excl. central bank), 
and monthly amounts outstanding of UK resident banks' (excl. central bank) total foreign currency loans to 
UK resident banks (inc. central bank) (in million sterling); series RPMTBG and RPMTBIH 
  National Bank of Denmark: 
http://nationalbanken.statistikbank.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=DNSEKT1&PLa
nguage=1&PXSId=0&ShowNews=OFF, banks' lending to monetary financial institutions 





ll=Stallning&starttid=1998M01&stopptid=2009M06&Fromwhere=M&lang=2&langdb=2, lending to 
Swedish banks and lending to foreign banks´ branches in Sweden; series 1030112 and 1030113 
  Swiss National Bank: http://www.snb.ch/ext/stats/bstamon/xls/en/bstamon_MB_AktivenIA_M1.xls 
claims against banks  
All series are converted in US dollars using end-period exchanges rates, by Bloomberg. 
Interbank lending of individual Italian banks 
  Data reported monthly by Italian banks to the Bank of Italy for supervisory purposes.  
 
Data on GDP ratios used in the fits 
  OECD: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CSP2009. GDP, import and export of goods and 
services 
  World Federation of Exchanges: http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/ytd-monthly. Stock market 
capitalization  
  Euronext: http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/ editorial-1803-EN.html. Breakdown of data relating 
to national exchanges merged in Euronext (Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris)  
  NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/about_us/. Breakdown of data 
relating to national exchanges merged in NASDAQ OMX (Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen, Iceland, 
Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius). 
  
36 
Data on number of banks 
  ECB : http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/mfi/general/html/mfis_list_2010-05.en.html, ECB, number of 
credit institutions in euro-area countries, 
and:http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/mfi/general/html/mfis_list_nea_2010-05.en.html, ECB, number of 
credit institutions in non-euro-area countries 
  US Federal Reserve, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current/default.htm, number of large 
commercial banks 
  Swiss National Bank: http://www.snb.ch/ext/stats/bankench/pdf/deen/Stat03.pdf, number of banks  
  
The measures of market risk 
Bloomberg and author’s calculations: Euribor-OIS spread; Nobili (2009): the expected loss is inferred from an 
aggregate series of premiums on 5-year CDS on the panels of the EURIBOR banks; the premium on the 
liquidity risk in the euro money market is inferred from the EURIBOR-OIS spread at the 3-month maturity; the 




ANNEX B   
  Banks included in the micro dataset 
Italian banks 
(1) Monte dei Paschi di Siena; (2) Banca Popolare di Milano; (3) IntesaSanPaolo; (4) Mediobanca; (5) UniCredit 
and (6) Unione di Banche Italiane (UBI). 
 
Foreign banks 
(1) Abn Amro Bank (NL); (2) Crédit Agricole (FR); (3) Allied Irish Banks (IE); (4) Anglo Irish Bank (IE); (5) 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (ES); (6) Banco Comercial Portugues (PT); (7) Banco Espirito Santo (PT); (8) 
BNP Paribas (FR); (9) Bank of Ireland (IE); (10) Banco Santander Central Hispano (ES); (11) Bayerische 
Landesbank (DE); (12) Natixis (FR); (13) Commerzbank (DE); (14) Deutsche Bank (DE); (15) Dresdner Bank 
(DE); (16) DZ Bank (DE); (17) Dexia Group (BE-FR); (18) IKB Deutsche Industriebank (DE); (19) Banco 
Popular Español (ES); (20); Banco Pastor (ES); (21) Rabobank (NL). 
 
 
ANNEX C   
Further details on the home bias indicator 
 
Result [1.c] leads to a minor underestimation of the home bias. Elaborating on the example introduced at the 
beginning of Section 2.2, consider a world populated by n banks of which nA are resident in country A and n-nA 
in the “rest-of-the-world”. Then, assume that each A’s bank lends 1 unit to any of these n-nA foreign 
counterparties and k  1 units to its nA-1 domestic fellows, while for the sake of simplicity all other banks lend 1 
unit to any other counterparty. Under these settings, simple algebra yields: 
DAA = nA (nA – 1) k 
DA,• = D•,A = nA (nA – 1) k + nA (n - nA) = nA [n + (k-1) nA – k] 
D•,• = n (n – 1) + nA (nA – 1)(k – 1)  
Hence,  












A , , A
A , A D
D D
D =      
  1 k 1 n n 1 n n
k n 1 k n n






A A    
  
   
When k = 1, the term on the right, and the resulting measure of HBA, should be 0. In fact,   
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while the full expression is  
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which amounts to -1.0% if, say, n = 100 e nA = 2. More results on the magnitude of this underestimation are in 
the following table: 
   n A 
   5  10  50  100 
  100  -0.96% -0.92% -0.67%   
n  1000  -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.09% 
  5000  -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% 
 
That is, the underestimation is larger, but still marginal, when both n and nA are small. This is because ultimately 
this small bias is due to the fact that [1.c] does not take into consideration that, given a population of n banks, 
each of them uses n-1 counterparties, not n. Obviously, the larger the overall population in proportion to the 
overall sample, the smaller is the impact of this difference by one unit.  
Measured on the actual data of the banking systems of the 17 countries, this population-bias takes values 
between 0.009-0.011%, depending on the specific national banking system.  
 
 
ANNEX D   
  Absolute risk aversion in the quadratic function 
 
Given the HARA function with parameter γ = 2 
[A.1]   
2 b w a
2
1
w U        a, w > 0 



























    

  b
a g   
where 












That is, the absolute risk aversion increases with the ratio a/b, where the agent is risk averse (RA > 0) so long as g 
< 1/w. Note that given two values w1 and w2 s.t. w2 > w1, then  
  1 A 2 A w ; 2 R
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